








CLPE Research Paper 5/2005 




Biometric Technology: The Impact on Privacy 
 
Keywords: biometrics, privacy, globalization 
 
Author Contact: Darcie Sherman 
London School of Economics, 
London, England, 2004 
Email: drsherman@rogers.com 




































CLPE Research Paper 1/2005 
 Vol. 01 No. 01 (2005)  
Darcie Sherman 
BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY: 
THE IMPACT ON PRIVACY 
 
Abstract: The introduction of biometric technology has resulted in a 
significant shift, which defies tradition and some of the very values that 
we cherish as a society. Additionally, there have been numerous recent 
developments, which have facilitated a fundamental global re-
assessment of the safety and security needs of our communities. Other 
challenges, like the delivery of government-granted social services, have 
resulted in governments looking for ways to ensure entitlement prior to 
the provision of finite resources to individuals. 
As technology is increasing in sophistication, it is being deployed in 
novel and creative ways to meet some of these new demands. However, 
where technology collides with individual rights and freedoms, we are 
required to examine the utilization of technologies to determine 
whether the use is proportionate to the alleged benefits. We are similarly 
compelled to decide whether there are less intrusive means to achieving 
the stated ends. This inquiry is even more relevant in the face of the 
new, seemingly global employment of biometric technology and the 
rationale behind governments developing dependence on this new 
machinery.  
This paper will examine (i) what biometric technology is; (ii) why it has 
become so popular; (iii) how biometric technology is being applied in 
every day use; and, (iv) the advantages and disadvantages of biometric 
technology. This assessment will occur in the context of the impact that 



























Changes, and the challenges that they often bring with them, 
sometimes result in a significant shift in the way that things have 
historically been done. When new technology is factored into this 
equation, the outcome can be a massive transformation, which 
defies not just tradition but also some of the very values that we 
cherish as a society. 
There have been numerous developments recently, which, have 
resulted in a fundamental global re-assessment of the safety and 
security needs of our communities. Other challenges, like the 
delivery of government-granted social services, have resulted in 
governments looking for ways to ensure entitlement prior to the 
provision finite resources to individuals. 
As technology is increasing in sophistication, it is being deployed 
in novel and creative ways to meet some of these new demands. 
However, where technology collides with individual rights and 
freedoms, we are required to examine the use of technologies to 
determine whether the use is proportionate to the alleged benefits. 
We are similarly compelled to decide whether there is a less 
intrusive means of achieving the stated ends. This inquiry is even 
more relevant in the face of the new, seemingly global 
employment of biometric technology and the rationale behind 
governments developing dependence on this new machinery. It is 
incontrovertible that this is the new future – what is not clear is 
whether biometric technology is a panacea or a placebo for the 
current maladies of society.  
This paper will examine (I) what biometric technology is; (II) why 
it has become so popular; (III) how biometric technology is being 
applied in every day use; and, (IV) the advantages and 
disadvantages of biometric technology. This assessment will occur 
in the context of the impact that this new technology is having on 
privacy and the privacy rights of individuals.   




I.1 WHAT ARE BIOMETRICS 
Biometrics have been described as “the science of identifying 
people based on their physiological and behavioural 
characteristics.”1 Other commentators have defined biometric 
technology as “generating a readable body: it transforms the body’s 
surfaces and characteristics into digital codes and ciphers to be 
‘read’ by a machine.”2 Still others contend that “biometrics are 
automated methods used to recognize people based on behavioural 
characteristics. Biometrics uses immutable personal 
characteristics, such as facial features, fingerprints, and retinal 
patterns, to establish and authenticate identity.3   
For the purposes of this paper, biometrics will be defined as 
referring to “the measurement and analysis of unique physical or 
behavioural characteristics (as fingerprints or voice patterns) 
especially as a means of verifying personal identity.”4  The 
emphasis here is on the utilization of an individual’s unique, 
immutable physical characteristics as a means of verifying an 
identity or identifying someone who is unknown.   
According to Kamini Bharvada, “verification involves confirming 
or denying a person’s claimed identity and identification is where 
one has to establish a person’s identity.”5  Identification 
verification process works by comparing two biometric 
representations, “usually called ‘templates,’ and decide whether 
                                            
1 Robin Feldman, ‘Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of 
Biometric Technology,’ 2003, 25 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J., p.1.    
2 Irma van der Ploeg, ‘The Illegal Body: ‘Eurodac’ and the Politics of Biometric 
Identification,’ 1999, Ethics and Information Technology, 1: p.1. 
3 Mark G. Milone, ‘Biometric Surveillance: Searching for Identity,’ 2001, 57 
Bus. Law, p.1. 
4 Merriam Webster, Collegiate Dictionary, 11th Ed., (Merriam Webster Inc., 
Massachusetts, 2003). 
5 Kamini Bharvada, ‘Electronic Signatures, Biometrics and PKI in the UK,’ 2002, 
International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, 16(3), p.270. 
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they are the same or not.”6  This is referred to as a one-to-one 
match and is used to allow specific individuals who have pre-
authorized access, admission. According to Tomko’s example of a 
bank machine, a one-to-one search may be  
Used when we are accessing such things as our bank 
machine….we want some form of control to serve as a 
gateway to let you and only you in, and keep all others 
out. In these activities though, we are not searching a 
database to identify you. We are actually authenticating 
your eligibility to access the bank machine.7 
By contrast, a “one-to-many” search “requires the system to read a 
person’s biometrics and scan a large database to find a match.”8  
This search “compares a specimen to large number of stored 
templates and checks whether the database contains a matching 
one.”9 This investigation is typically used when the individual’s 
identity is unknown and their biometric template is compared 
against a database of other similar templates. Tomko asserts that 
“in all cases, your fingerprint pattern, or a derivative of that 
pattern is stored in a database file and the one-to-many search 
strategy is an identification process.”10  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) states that “all 
biometric technology systems have certain aspects in common. 
All are dependent upon an accurate reference or “registration” 
sample. If a biometric system is to identify a person, it must first 
have this sample positively linked to the subject, to compare 
                                            
6 Irma van der Ploeg, ‘Biometrics and Privacy: A Note on the Politics of Theorizing 
Technology,’ Information, Communication & Society,’ 2003, 6:1, p.86. 
7 Dr. George Tomko, ‘Biometrics as a Privacy-Enhancing Technology: Friend or Foe of 
Privacy?’  Presented at the Privacy Laws & Business 9th Privacy Commissioners’/Data 
Protection Authorities Workshop, 1998, Online: 
<http://www.dss.state.ct.us/digital/tomko.htm>, p.2.  
8 Supra, note 1, p.2.  
9 Supra, note 6, p.86.  
10 Supra, note 7, p.2.  




against.”11 The EFF further suggests that “modern biometric 
identification systems, based on digital technology, analyze 
personal physical attributes at the time of registration and distil 
them into a series of numbers. Once this reference sample is in the 
system, future attempts to identify a person are based on a 
comparison of a “live” sample and the reference sample or 
samples.”12 The registration requirement is essential regardless of 
type of biometric being utilized. There are many different systems 
currently being used with additional structures under 
development. As a result, a review of some of the current 
biometric technology may help to clarify the importance of the 
enrolment process. 
I.2 FINGERPRINTING 
According to the EFF, fingerprinting is a highly familiar and well-
established biometric science.  The traditional use of 
fingerprinting, of course, has been as a forensic criminological 
technique, used to identify perpetrators…this comparison uses the 
unique features of any given fingerprint, including its overall 
shape, and pattern of ridges, valleys, and their bifurcations and 
terminations to establish the identity of the perpetrator.”13  The 
EFF claims that with “modern biometrics, these features called 
fingerprint minutiae, can be captured, analyzed, and compared 
electronically, with correlations drawn between a live sample and 
a referenced sample, as with other biometric technologies.”14  
Bharvada asserts that “fingerprints are the most widely used 
biometric and have the advantage of being cheaper and simpler 
than most other biometrics. They are of course useful to combat 
                                            
11 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Biometrics: Who’s Watching You?,’ Online: 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
<http://www.eff.org/privacy/surveillance/biometrics>, p.7. 
12 Ibid., p.7.  
13 Supra, note 11, p.10.  
14 Ibid., p.10. 
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identity fraud…”15 However, while fingerprints are regarded as 
reliable, changing only in size with age, being highly resistant to 
modification or injury and difficult to forge,16 there is a certain 
stigma that is attached to the use of fingerprints due to their 
lengthy association with criminals and crime. As a result, people 
may be less inclined to willingly participate in systems, which use 
this technology and any discussions around fingerprinting social 
assistance recipients or asylum seekers invariably meets with 
resistance.  
I.3 HAND GEOMETRY   
According to Feldman, “hand geometry technology creates 
mathematical pattern abstractions using data derived from the 
length, width, thickness, curvature and surface area of the hand 
and four fingers. The quality of the enrolment image will affect 
how often the system falsely rejects the individual in the 
future…”17   
The EFF contends that hand geometry is “the most ubiquitous 
electronic biometric system.”18  
The hand geometry-based systems require the subject to 
place his or her hand (usually the right hand) on a plate 
where it is photographically captured and measured…the 
human hand presents a sufficiently peculiar conformation 
of anatomical features to enable authentication, but is not 
considered sufficiently unique to provide full 
identification….a simple hand geometry system will 
measure length and thickness of digits, width of the palm 
at various points and the radius of the palm. This results 
                                            
15 Supra, note 5, p.269.  
16 Supra, note 11, p.10.  
17 Supra, note 1, p.4.  
18 Supra, note 11, p.9.  




in a relatively simple identification that can be expressed 
in a very simple, compact string of data. 19 
The EFF asserts that with respect to the deployment of 
“traditional hand geometry systems, they have typically found 
acceptance in applications requiring verification of an identity, 
rather than a full proof or establishment of an identity.”20 These 
are characteristically situations where an individual is 
endeavouring “to prove or disprove their membership in a 
relatively small group of people...”21 However, “when the stakes 
are high, these systems are not relied on exclusively to confirm 
identity; rather they are used to provide an additional layer of 
security above and beyond… existing security systems.” 22 
I.4 IRIS AND RETINA SCANNING 
The human eye is believed to present “two features with excellent 
properties for identification. Both the iris (the coloured part visible 
at the front of the eye) and the veins of the retina (the thin film of 
nerve endings inside the eyeball that capture light and send it back 
to your brain) provide patterns that can uniquely identify an 
individual.”23  
Of the two, “retinal scanning is the older technology, and requires 
the subject to look into a reticle and focus on a visible target while 
the scan is completed.”24 The purpose of this scan is to allow the 
system to “analyze the patterns of veins occurring in the back of 
the eye.”25  Naturally, its regarded as “one of the more intrusive 
                                            
19 Ibid., p.9.  
20 Supra, note 11, p.10.  
21 Ibid, p.10.  
22 Supra, note 11, p.10.  
23 Ibid, p.11.  
24 Supra, note 11, p.10.  
25 Supra, note 1, p.4.  
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biometric technologies, with some subjects reporting discomfort 
at the scanning method.” 26 
By way of contrast, the iris scan “uses an infrared light to identify 
and create mathematical abstractions of patterns in the coloured 
tissue around the centre of the eye.”27 The “pattern of lines and 
colours on the eye are…analyzed, digitized and compared against a 
reference sample for verification.”28 According to the EFF, the iris 
recognition has an advantage in ease of use, in that it merely 
requires the subject to look at a camera from a distance of three to 
ten inches.29 
Finally, iris scanners are considered by some to be “by far the most 
reliable biometric, but relatively expensive.”30  However, to their 
merit, “iris scans are painless and can be carried out without the 
subject even noticing.”31  Of course, this illustrates one of the 
privacy concerns of opponents of this technology.  
I.5 FACIAL RECOGNITION  
The EFF maintains that facial recognition sprung into the national 
spotlight during the 2001 Super Bowl, when Tampa police scanned 
the faces of game fans without their knowledge for the purpose of 
spotting terrorists in the crowd. Facial recognition remains one of 
the more controversial biometric technologies because of its very 
unobtrusiveness. With good cameras and good lighting, a facial 
recognition system can sample faces from tremendous distances 
without the subject’s knowledge or consent.32     
                                            
26 Supra, note 11, p.11.  
27 Supra, note 1, p.5.  
28 Supra, note 11, p.11.  
29 Ibid., p.11.  
30 Supra, note 5, p.270.  
31 Ibid., p.270.  
32 Supra, note 11, p.11.  




According to Susan McCoy, “the fundamental principle behind 
facial recognition technology is that each person’s face can be 
numerically coded and then compared to a database of thousands 
of other identities of either known criminals or authorized 
personnel, in nearly real-time.”33  The EFF states that  
Most facial recognition technology works by one of two 
methods: facial geometry or eigenface comparison. Facial 
geometry analysis works by taking a known reference 
point (for example, the distance from eye to eye), and 
measuring the various features of the face in their distance 
and angles from this reference point.  Eigenface 
comparison uses a palette of about 150 facial abstractions, 
and compares the captured face with these archetypal 
abstract faces.34 
According to Bridget Mallon, the technology was formulated in 
the early 1990’s as a U.S. Department of Defence initiative called 
the FERET program. The program was designed to determine 
whether it would be possible to use algorithms accurately to 
measure human faces…. the program concluded in 1998, with 
private corporations waiting anxiously to capitalize on the new 
technology.35 These companies are now in the business of 
supplying, operating and maintaining this technology for 
governments and the private sector for use in “public” places. 
Bharvada suggests that “facial recognition technology is becoming 
more widespread because it can exploit existing cameras and 
databases for facial images from driving licences and passports. 
Further, unlike other biometrics, facial recognition can operate 
                                            
33 Susan McCoy, ‘O Big Brother Where Art Thou? The Constitutional Use of 
Facial Recognition Technology,’ 2002, 20 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., 
p.2.  
34 Supra, note 11, p.11.  
35 Bridget Mallon, ‘ “Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make, I’ll Be 
Watching You,” The Use of Face Recognition Technology,’ 2003, 48 Vill. L. 
Rev., p.2.  
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passively, without people realizing that they are being scanned.”36 
There is something about the covertness of this surveillance that 
occurs without the knowledge or consent of the subjects, that 
causes the greatest concern and objection of opponents of this 
technology. 
I.6 OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
While the discussion thus far has focused on some of the more 
predominant biometric technology in use, there are some other 
developments in this field, which are briefly notable.  Voice 
verification is thought to offer an interesting possibility because it 
works by analysing an individual’s fundamental vocal 
characteristics.37 The premise is that it would allow remote 
identification using a phone system, an infrastructure that is 
already in existence and therefore has zero client side costs.38 
However, voice verification systems are required to account for 
more variables than other systems such as the compression of a 
voice captured by cheap microphones like the kind found on 
phone handsets, background noise and other artefacts. Other 
problems include the tremendous variability of the human voice 
due to colds, aging and fatigue.39  Naturally, there are serious 
issues around the reliability of this technology.  
Finally, according to Bharvada, there are a series of other biometric 
techniques currently under development, which are noteworthy. 
Some of these new technologies include analyzing “the sound 
emitted from the vibration of our major organs and even body 
odour recognition.”40 It is unlikely that these will be in general 
public use in the near future but it would certainly be interesting 
                                            
36 Supra, note 5, p.270.  
37 Ibid.,  p.270.  
38 Supra, note 11, p.11.  
39 Ibid., p.12.  
40 Supra, note 5, p.270.  
 




to see the technology that would have to be developed for the 
registration, capture and analysis of such new techniques. 
 
II. WHY HAVE BIOMETRICS BECOME SO POPULAR 
Biometric technology has received significant attention in the last 
few years and its application in every day use has become 
considerably more common recently. However, the explanations 
for this development seem to vary with commentators identifying 
diverging reasons for this expansion.  
II.1 SEPTEMBER 11 
According to the EFF, the renewed attention to biometric 
technology is one of the many reactions to the September 11 
tragedy.41 Mallon asserts that “as a result of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, airports and cities across the country are 
looking to use new technology to regain a level of safety and 
security that seems to have been lost. As a result, the biometric 
industry as a whole, as experienced unprecedented growth over the 
past few years.”42 
Van der Ploeg adds that “following the events of September 
Eleventh these security needs have been elevated everywhere to 
the highest priority level, resulting in a strong push towards high-
tech solutions.43 
II.2 SOCIAL SERVICES ENTITLEMENT 
Another reason for the expanding demand for biometric 
technology comes from the social services sector. Van der Ploeg 
suggests that “one of the principal domains in which experiments 
                                            
41 Supra, note 11, p.1.  
42 Supra, note 35, p.8.  
43 Supra, note 6, p.86.  
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with biometrics are being conducted are departments in charge of 
social assistance and welfare programs in countries like the USA, 
Canada, Spain and the Netherlands, which are launching programs 
for detecting and preventing so-called double-dipping.”44 “Double-
dipping” is described as “a kind of fraud that involves the 
collection of more benefits than one is entitled to, by entering the 
program under two or more identities. A wide consensus appears 
to exist concerning the high levels of this type of fraud, and hence 
concerning the urgency of the need for new identification 
practices.”45  
According to the EFF, “even prior to September 11…large scale 
civilian biometric identification systems were being pushed.”46 In 
the U.S., both “the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of (1995)…, a welfare reform law, and the 
Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act (1996),… 
an immigration reform law, called for the use of “technology” for 
identification purposes.”47  
II.3 IDENTITY FRAUD 
A related problem to double dipping, which is becoming a 
widespread predicament beyond the multiple identities used in the 
social services or immigration context, is the issue of identity 
theft. Tomko asserts that “identity fraud… is a growth industry. 
Biometrics are being viewed as a solution to identity fraud because 
they can be used, not only to positively authenticate, but if one 
wants, also to track individuals and their transactions.”48 While 
authentication is certainly a reasonable goal, the ability to be able 
to track individuals and their transactions adds a level of scrutiny 
and surveillance that is deeply disconcerting. 
                                            
44 Ibid., p.86.  
45 Supra, note 6, p.86.  
46 Supra, note 11, p.3.   
47 Ibid., p.3.  
48 Supra, note 7, p.3.  




Another development which existed before September Eleventh, 
but which has significantly increased since, is a heightened 
government demand to identify individuals attempting to enter a 
national border. Nowhere is this more  evident than in countries 
like the U.K. and in particular, the U.S.  According to Neda Matar, 
“using secure identification may also mean preventing national 
crises. Our need to identify those who enter the United States, 
manage those who overstay their welcome, and be alerted to 
terrorist-like patterns of activity has taken on a new level of 
urgency.”49  
II.4 TRAVEL EFFICIENCY 
Mark Milone suggests that the need for accurate and efficient 
verification of identity has led to the demand for biometric 
technology. “Biometrics provide the potential for improved 
security that is particularly important in the international travel 
context. It allows for stronger access control and strengthened 
document integrity. Biometrics are also promising in terms of 
facilitating travel.”50 Biometrically enhanced procedures are 
believed to enable more efficient border crossings for pre-cleared 
frequent travellers. 
II.5 IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 
At the other end of the border-protection spectrum is the 
increasing demand to better identify visitors who enter a country 
under the pretence of study, those seeking asylum or individuals 
who have managed to overstay their visits. The U.K. is extremely 
concerned with processing legitimate asylum seekers and the 
Home Office has been working to introduce a smart card 
Application Registration Card for asylum seekers, which would 
                                            
49 Neda Matar, ‘Are You Ready for a National ID Card? Perhaps We Don’t Have 
to Choose Between Fear of Terrorism and Need for Privacy,’ 2003, 17 Emory 
Int’l. L. Rev., p.11. 
50 Supra, note 3, p.2.  
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contain fingerprint data. Recent reports indicate that this system 
is “already going live, and could be said to undercut one of the 
objectives floated for an ID card, the proof by asylum seekers of 
entitlement to health service treatment.”51  With health care and 
other social services resources being extremely limited, the British 
government is particularly concerned with people claiming asylum 
simply to access free health care services, at the expense of British 
citizens.52 
II.6 ANONYMOUS TRANSACTIONS 
Finally, with the advent of new technology such as the Internet, 
digital communications and the global development of e-
commerce transactions, business dealings are becoming more 
anonymous than ever before. According to van der Ploeg,  
With the rapid proliferation of information technologies, 
data processing, electronic transactions and service 
delivery affecting everyday life in multiple ways a strong 
need for new identification practices has emerged. In 
numerous contexts, technologically mediated and 
automated economic and social interaction replaces 
physical and face-to-face encounters, depriving interacting 
partners of traditional, trusted ways of establishing to each 
other who they are.53  
Due to the growing number of online transactions, merchants are 
never actually meeting with their customer and have no way of 
                                            
51 The Register, ‘Smart Cards, ID Cards, Nice, Nasty, Inevitable?,’ by John 
Lettice, 4th August, 2003, Online: 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/04/smart_cards_id_cards_nice>, p.2.  
(Last accessed on 9 August 2004). 
52 BBC News, UK Edition, ‘Health Tourism Rules Unveiled,’ 30 December 2003, 
Online: BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3355751.stm>; BBC News, UK 
Edition, ‘Tories Target ‘Health Tourism’,’ 1 June 2003, Online: BBC 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2954438.stm>. 
(Last accessed on 14 August 2004). 
53 Supra, note 6, p.86. 




verifying the identity of their purchaser. This invariably leads to 
serious trust and security issues, and the potential for fraud and 
identity theft. 
Additionally, Bharvada asserts that “the movement to open 
network communication systems, such as the Internet poses 
significant challenges to implementation of a global electronic 
trading system. Among the most significant concerns are those 
pertaining to security of the information involved, that is, 
confidentiality, trust, integrity and availability. The reduction of 
the risk of fraud and unauthorized access is vital to enable 
electronic commerce to truly expand on a global scale.”54  
While security is essential to fostering a flourishing electronic 
commerce environment, it does not go far enough to resolving the 
issue of the anonymity of the consumer. Biometrics are being 
touted as the leading solution to the problem of authenticating the 
identity of the unknown consumer. However, the issue of how and 
where these new biometric technologies are being deployed is 
essential to developing a more complete understanding of the 
technology before examining the advantages and disadvantages 
that they may pose in relation to privacy.  
 
III. APPLICATIONS OF BIOMETRICS INTO EVERYDAY USE 
Biometrics are now being used or deliberated upon for use in a 
variety of applications. Where a particular biometric is utilized 
will be contingent on the expense associated with the technology 
and the relative significance of the place where the technology is 
being considered for deployment. An examination of how this 
technology is being employed is important in order to better 
comprehend the areas which are regarded by government and the 
                                            
54 Supra, note 5, p.266.  
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private sector as posing a more serious threat which justifies the 
expenditure for additional security. 
Various biometric technologies are being employed in the 
protection of open and public spaces. Examples of spaces where 
biometrics are being utilized would include airports, secured 
buildings which accommodate the government and the private 
sector, casinos, sporting events and other large open places. 
According to a recent newspaper report, fingerprint technology 
appears to still be the technology of choice in certain shopping 
areas and airports in England.  
Shops in Bracknell, Houslow and other locations around 
the UK are beginning to experiment with a thumbprint 
signature scheme requiring customers who pay by cheque 
to provide a thumbprint as an extra precaution against 
fraud. London City Airport secures its staff areas with a 
photo ID pass with a fingerprint embedded in it, which 
acts as both an ID card and access control card for its 1,600 
employees.55  
By comparison, Philip Agre confirms that the use of facial 
recognition systems in the public came to public attention when it 
emerged that fans attending the Super Bowl had unknowingly 
been matched against a database of alleged criminals, and when 
the city of Tampa deployed a face-recognition system in the 
nightlife district of Ybor City.56  It is interesting to note that in the 
case of the Super Bowl, spectators were unaware that their faces 
were being scanned. By comparison, “as people walk down the 
streets of Tampa, Florida’s historic Ybor City, they are greeted by 
                                            
55 The Independent (London), ‘Ever Feel You’re Being Watched?; Whether You’re 
Travelling, Shopping, or on the Way to Work, Your Eyes Have it,’ 13 August, 
2003, p.1. 
56 Philip E. Agre, ‘Your Face is Not a Bar Code: Arguments Against Automatic 
Face Recognition in Public Places,’ 2003, Online: 
<http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/bar-code.html>, p.1. 




signs stating “Area Under Video Monitoring.”57 Informing people 
that an area is under surveillance re-empowers individuals, 
permitting them to make a more fully informed decision about 
whether they wish to attend an area that is being monitored. This 
is a significantly different situation from where surveillance is 
occurring surreptitiously. 
According to Mallon, the U.S. is not the only country utilizing 
facial recognition systems. “England was one of the first nations to 
capitalize on this new technology. Since the fall of 1998, Newham 
England, a borough of London, began monitoring its citizens with 
the same face recognition system as used at the Super Bowl…. 
British officials were so impressed with the new technology that 
they announced a plan in 2000 to expand its use. They expect to 
install almost two million cameras across the country to aid law 
enforcement officials.”58  In a recent article, the estimated number 
of cameras currently deployed across Britain is 4.2 million.59 While 
its true that not all of these cameras will be utilized for facial 
recognition systems, the front-end technology is certainly in place 
for widespread deployment when, not if, the government decides 
to implement its use more broadly. 
As previously mentioned, biometrics are also being deployed in 
the social services sector as “double-dipping” and welfare fraud are 
growing issues in many countries. In 1997 in the province of 
Ontario, Canada, the government passed Bill 142, a Social 
Assistance Reform Act, which included the Ontario Works Act, 
1997, S.O.1997, Ch.25. While this legislation was controversial, 
the most contentious provisions enabled the government’s welfare 
agents to require that recipients submit to being fingerprinted 
                                            
57 Supra, note 35, p.3.  
58 Ibid., p.4. 
59 PoliceOne.com, ‘Big Brother Always Watching in Britain, Where Surveillance 
Cameras Are King,’ by Jane Wardell, The Associated Press, 13 August 2004, Online: 
PoliceOne.com <http://www.policeone.com/policeone/frontend/parser.cfm>. 
(Last accessed on 18 August 2004). 
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before receiving any benefits.60 What was even more astounding 
was the support that a similar program introduced by the City of 
Toronto received from the provincial Information and Privacy 
Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian. Cavoukian suggested that 
because the encrypted fingerprint scans would be applied in a very 
defined, narrow purpose and the potential risks to privacy had 
been considered carefully in consultation with her office, the 
threat to privacy would be acceptable.61  
As discussed, in the intervening years since the introduction of 
these programs, many other countries have either introduced 
similar programs or are in the process of considering the use of 
such technology to stop welfare fraud. The threat to individual 
privacy through the implementation of these systems is palpable. 
In terms of immigration and travel, biometric technology is being 
introduced using a variety of techniques. According to a recent 
news article, “the biggest revolution is in travel document. Soon 
all new passports will contain a microchip holding at least one 
biometric, probably two. The justification for this emanates from 
the U.S., which in 2002 enacted legislation requiring all “visa-
waiver” countries (which includes the U.K.) to begin issuing 
biometric passports by October 2004.”62 Apparently, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) has 
recommended facial recognition as the standard because, in their 
view, it is the logical extension of the existing photograph. 
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However, each country is free to add a second biometric of their 
choice.63  
For frequent travellers who have been assessed as ‘low-risk’ 
travellers, the use biometrics in travel documents is claimed to 
enable more efficient processing. Travellers will be able to “jump 
queue and avoid through controls.”64 
Asylum seekers in Europe are faced with the collection of their 
fingerprints. In 1997, the European Council introduced the 
‘Eurodac’ system, which created a centralized database of the 
digitized fingerprints of every asylum seeker over the age of 
fourteen years, as taken and submitted by every Member State.65 
The stated purpose of Eurodac is “to establish the identity of 
applicants for asylum and of persons apprehended in connection 
with the unlawful crossing of the external borders of the 
community….it is also desirable…to allow each Member State to 
check whether an alien found illegally present on its territory has 
applied for asylum in another Member State.”66  It is believed that 
this process will create greater efficiency in the processing of the 
applications of asylum seekers within the European Community. 
Another application of biometric technologies is the renewed 
efforts by governments in the development of national 
identification cards. Currently, several countries are exploring the 
possibility of rolling out a national identity card to be used by all 
citizens. These cards are believed to be capable of replacing the 
need for other currently used documents like driver’s licences or 
social security cards. 
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According to the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest 
Clinic (“CIPPIC”), a national ID card can be broadly defined as a 
nationwide, all purpose identification document… It would likely 
come in the form of a plastic card, with a computer chip 
containing name, date, place of birth and gender of the bearer. 
Possible additional information would be physical attributes, such 
as height, eye colour, or other information like current address, a 
sample signature, academic degrees or stage names.67 These cards 
have the possibility of including biometric data, such as a 
fingerprint or retinal pattern in the card.  
Matar contends that the  
Implementation of the card raises two fundamental issues: 
security and privacy. The identification card can 
significantly improve national security by providing 
reliable verification, as well as a common denominator 
through which agencies can cross-reference their 
information. Standardized tamper-proof identification 
cards used by citizens, residents and visitors containing 
personal information about the cardholder would facilitate 
this verification and the ability to create watch-lists.68 
Matar additionally asserts that the cards could also contain the 
bearer’s biometric data while acknowledging that the inclusion of 
this information would significantly invade the privacy of 
Americans, as well as visitors. Matar asserts that “implementing a 
national identification card in the United States for the purpose of 
meeting our security goals need not cost us our privacy. A delicate 
balance must be struck between security and privacy interests.”69 
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National ID cards are currently in use in Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain. According to CIPPIC, “none of the 
major common law countries (United States, Canada, U.K., 
Australia and New Zealand) has a national ID card regime. 
However, like Canada, the U.K. is currently investigating possible 
ways of introducing either voluntary or mandatory ID cards.”70 In 
fact, in the U.K. the implementation of a national ID (aka 
“entitlement”) card has been described as Home Secretary David 
Blunkett’s “pet project.”71  
In a recent article, David Blunkett was quoted as saying that he 
was planning on “pushing on with plan for an ID card, with a draft 
bill to hit Parliament within months. The ID card will contain 
biometrics and may be in the wallets of UK citizens by 2007 at the 
earliest. …the introduction is necessary to give the government 
better control over immigration and prevent terrorists from using 
multiple identities.72  Blunkett, who has been described as “an 
enthusiastic advocate of the use of biometrics…,”73 had his plans 
for the implementation of a compulsory ID card scuttled in 
November 2003, when the Cabinet rejected his plan.74  Blunkett’s 
recent comments indicate his determination to proceed with the 
introduction of a biometric-based, national ID card in the UK with 
due speed, despite the well-founded objections of opponents and 
the fact that the technology remains unproven. 
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There is no question that in the face of the new post-September 
Eleventh reality governments are looking hard for some tool to 
restore a sense of safety, security and order for their citizens. 
Biometric technology is regarded by many as the solution. It 
promises to authenticate and verify unknown individuals. It is 
purported to prevent identity fraud, stop welfare cheats, identify 
asylum seekers, and eliminate anonymity in transactions. 
However, a review of the advantages and disadvantages of 
biometric technology may provide a more balanced view by 
allowing for examination beyond these immediate objectives 
 
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BIOMETRICS 
As with other technologies, there are advantages and 
disadvantages in the application of biometric technology for 
purposes like security, social services entitlement, immigration, 
travel and national identity cards. The rationale for examining 
both the advantages and disadvantages is to determine who in fact 
benefits from the implementation of these systems -the 
government and the private sector, and whether there is any 
benefit for the average person. 
IV.1 ADVANTAGES 
According to McCoy, “privacy advocates argue that facial 
recognition technology is not cost effective because additional 
security staff are required to run the software adequately. Contrary 
to this argument, the implementation of facial-recognition 
technology will not create the need to spend capital on more 
security personnel. Instead, it will make the duties of existing 
personnel more efficient.”75 McCoy contends that since the system 
does the actual checking, looking for matches that are merely 
verified by the human system operator, that additional staff are 
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not required and as a result, there are greater efficiencies to be 
realized by utilizing this type of biometric system.  
However, human error in determining whether there is a match is 
not a secure backstop on this system, instead, it is part of the 
overall process with the facial recognition system, due to the 
deficiencies of the technology.  Since people often change their 
appearances through age, weight gain or loss, illness, different 
glasses or hairstyles which may be misinterpreted by the 
technology, relying on a human to make such a determination has 
a number of potentially negative consequences for the subject 
person. Primarily, if the system indicates that there is a match, the 
onus would then fall on the subject individual to disprove that the 
image is theirs. Depending on the circumstance, this could lead to 
embarrassment, and serious inconvenience such as missed flights 
or denial of access. It is quite possible that additional security 
personnel and more capital may indeed be required to deal with 
false matches or rejects.  
Matar suggests that national security in the context of preventing 
terrorism requires database matching and reliable identification. 
While the latter only refers to a “trustworthy identification with 
which to track individuals,” the former requires the sharing of 
information between police and government agencies, such as the 
FBI, CIA and state police departments.76  
Matar further alludes that a national security card, which utilizes 
either a centralized or decentralized database, will result in the 
greater sharing of information between these competing 
organizations, leading to greater overall efficiency. This view 
seems rather naïve. Since these organizations have historically had 
great trouble sharing information or cooperating with each other 
under regular law enforcement circumstances, it seems unlikely 
that the introduction of new technology will suddenly foster a 
new era of sharing and cooperation.   
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Simon Davies points to the advantage of accurate identification of 
individuals as a major benefit, which follows from the 
implementation of a biometric technology system. Accordingly, 
“the accurate identification of individuals is a key concern for 
many Government agencies and corporations. It is important to 
them because it contributes significantly to administrative 
efficiency and the control of fraud, and can offer benefits to clients 
as well.”77 
In addition, Davies states that some of the declared “potential 
benefits of an integrated biometrics-based identification system 
include improvements in the cost of administration; the integrity 
of identification; the integrity of information; access to 
information; the speed of delivery of services and benefits; the 
accuracy and quality of research; and the level of technical 
security of communications.”78 However, Davies adds that where 
these technologies are applied to a specific business or 
administrative function within a particular organization, the 
implementation is usually successful. Further, “the majority of 
these success stories have in common a manageable size, a limited 
geographic spread, a single purpose and modest and easily defined 
goals. Where biometric technologies are applied to specific 
purposes, some confidence may be felt in the system’s ability to 
deliver the intended benefits. On the other hand, many failures 
and disappointments continue to occur, even among seemingly 
straightforward projects.”79 
Some of the other suggested advantages achieved through the 
implementation of biometric technology include: verification of 
identity in a manner that is convenient, more accurate and secure 
than exists with current methods, and the elimination of the 
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reliance on passwords.80 It is likewise believed that the integration 
of biometric technology into passports and Machine Readable 
Travel Documents, as required by the new ICAO standard, will 
lead to greater security as these identifications are considered to be 
harder to falsify or tamper with. 
Finally, some commentators believe that the use of biometric 
technology will improve the “safety and security of every day 
activities…which is of utmost importance to the general public 
considering the recent terrorist attacks directed at the innocent 
citizens of this country.”81  McCoy declares that “this technology 
is necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks and it should not 
be dismissed because of a mere potential for abuse when 
precautions can be implemented.”82   
 McCoy concludes by dismissing opponents concerns about 
the potential privacy violations through use of biometric systems 
by averring that facial recognition technology does not violate 
privacy rights because it is merely making a procedure currently 
used by law enforcement more efficient. In McCoy’s estimation, 
facial recognition technology is akin to matching faces to 
pictures.83  Further, facial recognition technology is also similar to 
fingerprinting, which has been used to identify perpetrators of 
crimes for over a century…. fingerprinting is a law enforcement 
procedure…if fingerprinting does not violate the constitution, then 
neither should facial recognition technology.84   
IV.2 DISADVANTAGES 
The implementation of biometric technology does have some 
potentially significant benefits in terms of the creation of tamper-
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proof documents which are not easily falsified; and the prevention 
of fraud and identity theft by challenging the further use of 
multiple identities. However, there are some very serious 
problems with the technology, which raise grave concerns that 
need to be addressed.  To begin with, the potential for increased 
surveillance and the threat to privacy are enormous.  
In terms of surveillance, David Lyon states that one of the 
responses that occurred following September Eleventh was the 
extensive tightening of surveillance. The reactions can be 
compared to  
A prism that puts several things in perspective. One, it is 
premature to see decentralized and commercial 
surveillance simply supplanting nation-state power…. 
Two, reliance on high tech surveillance methods is 
undaunted by the low-tech attacks or the failure of high 
tech security systems already in place. While they may 
not work to curb terrorism they are likely to impede civil 
rights for citizens who will be even more profiled and 
screened. Three, the struggle to make mushrooming 
surveillance systems more democratically accountable and 
amenable to ethical scrutiny is being set back by panic 
regimes following September Eleventh.85  
Examples of increased surveillance include enlarged surveillance 
of Internet activity, and public spaces by digital video cameras, 
and the adoption of national identification cards embedded with 
biometric information. At the same time, governments have 
weakened traditional legal protections against unauthorized police 
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searches and are increasingly turning to private sector databases to 
access previously collected personal information.86  
As a result, Lyon suggests that the type of social structure and 
processes that are evolving as a consequence are an expanding 
range of the already existing surveillance processes and practices 
that circumscribe and shape our social existence, and the tendency 
to rely on technological enhancements to surveillance systems 
even when it is unclear that they work or address the problems 
that they were intended to resolve.87 Post September Eleventh, “it 
is safe to suggest that the intensity and the centralization of 
surveillance in Western countries is increasing dramatically…such 
systems once in place, are harder to dismantle than to install.”88  
According to Lyon, high-tech companies that had been working to 
develop new technology and waiting for an opportunity to launch 
their new products, saw September Eleventh as providing just the 
platform they needed.89  The problem is that while panicking 
governments and populaces embraced this new technology, they 
disregarded several unresolved issues.  
These technologies may be tried but not tested. That is, it 
is not clear that they work with the kind of precision that 
is required and thus, may not achieve the ends intended. 
Two, they are likely to have unintended consequences 
that include reinforcing forms of social division and 
exclusion within the countries where they are established.  
Third, a larger dimension of the technological aspect of 
surveillance practices is that seeking superior technologies 
appears as the primary goal. No matter that the original 
terrorism involved reliance on relatively aged technologies 
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–jet aircraft of a type that had been around for 30 years, 
sharp knives and so on –it is assumed that high tech 
solutions are called for.  Moreover, the kinds of 
technologies sought …rely heavily on the use of 
searchable databases, with the aim of pre-empting acts of 
terrorism by isolating in advance potential perpetrators. 90   
What is clear is that the technology of today is enabling far-greater 
surveillance, but is not up to the job of pre-empting terrorism or 
other potentially nefarious behaviour. “Surveillance can only 
anticipate up to a point, and in some very limited circumstances. 
However, searchable databases and international communications 
interception were fully operational on September 10, to no avail. 
The likely result will be that internal surveillance of citizens by 
the state will increase. And if ‘terrorists’ are apprehended it will be 
by other means.”91 In the meantime, the public, particularly the 
American public, appears ready to sacrifice their privacy and 
permit government intrusions into their affairs in the name of 
safety, security and routing out the “evil doers.”92 
 Biometric technology also poses a very serious threat to 
privacy. Feldman asserts that “biometrics are merely a form of 
data. Thus, collection of biometric data raises some of the same 
issues that arise when government agencies or private firms 
collect any information about citizens.”93  Further, there are two 
specific issues that relate to the collection of biometric data. 
“First, some commentators express concern that biometric data 
could potentially reveal information about health status…second, 
biometric technology raises for many people the spectre of 
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government tracking.”94 The concern is that the collection of 
biometric information will result in heightened monitoring of 
individuals. 
According to Cavoukian,  
A fingerprint, and the broader family of biometrics…offer 
irrefutable evidence of one’s identity since they are unique 
biological characteristics which distinguish one person 
from another, and which can only be linked to one 
individual. An identifiable fingerprint can act as a 
powerful unique identifier that can bring together 
disparate pieces of personal information about an 
individual. If used as a unique identifier, a fingerprint 
enables individuals to be pinpointed and tracked. It also 
creates the potential for personal information from 
different sources to be linked together to form a detailed 
profile about the individual unbeknownst to him or her. 
This presents a clear invasion of privacy; one that most 
people would object to.95 
Privacy is said to revolve “around the freedom of choice; without 
the ability to exercise some reasonable sense of control over the 
use of one’s information, privacy will become but a quaint 
notion.”96 Matar adds that “privacy is one of the personal 
attributes that most people innately cherish. We have an 
instinctive desire to protect ourselves from being overly exposed. 
We naturally seek to control who knows us personally, who may 
get to know us well, and who has personal/private information 
about us.”97  
 The sense is that with biometric technology, personal 
information is gathered and stored easily and surreptitiously 
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without the subject having control or knowledge. Further, and 
most disconcertingly, the public has no idea who has access to the 
information being gathered or how it will be used. 
Some commentators suggest that “the benefits of implementing 
facial-recognition technology are far more important than the 
benefits of rights to privacy in public places.”98  They claim that 
society is not willing to protect privacy at the price of risking their 
safety.99 It has also been asserted that “society is not willing to 
grant freedom from facial-recognition technology by allowing 
individuals to have reasonable expectations of privacy in public 
places. Facial recognition technology is the first step to the larger 
solution of ending terrorist attacks and decreasing criminal 
activity.”100 
 While the terrorist attacks undoubtedly shook the 
American psyche to the core, and deeply affected the rest of the 
world, there is an intense willingness to embrace any technology 
that might offer even a scintilla of hope in preventing a repeat of 
the horrors of September Eleventh. Unfortunately, this appears to 
include a blind faith in untested biometric technology and an 
eagerness to submit to public authorities and their agents, all of 
the hard fought rights and freedoms of privacy, without any proof 
that such a sacrifice is even justified. There is, after all, no 
evidence that the technology is completely effective or that it 
would be successful in stopping terrorists and other criminals.  
However, reliance on unproven technology and the covert 
collection of personal information might not be the biggest 
problem with biometric technology. According to Cavoukian, “the 
threat to privacy arises not from the positive identification that 
biometrics provide, but the ability of third parties to access this in 
identifiable form and link it to other information, resulting in 
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secondary uses of that information, without the consent of the 
data subject. This erodes the personal control of an individual over 
the uses of his or her information.”101  Mallon adds that  
The true privacy problems arise from third-party use of 
…technology. The biggest concern stemming from third 
party use is the potential for private citizens to develop 
and maintain vast amounts of information on 
individuals…. the fact that technology is giving private 
individuals power to recall personal information with a 
simple photograph raises concerns over the need to 
regulate this new technology. Without restriction, there is 
the potential for private use of face recognition technology 
(and other biometrics) to cross the boundary from 
providing security to invading privacy.102 
There are two problems which impact privacy that are illuminated 
here. The first deals with the lack of accountability and potential 
for abuse by government and the private sector that operate these 
technologies; and the second pertains to the overarching need for 
regulation and legislation to define the parameters in which these 
groups should operate. Both of these will be discussed here briefly.  
Feldman suggests that the “individual’s interest in ensuring the 
accuracy and proper use of personal biometric information is 
unlikely to be fully represented by other actors in the system.”103 
Agre asserts that “the potential for abuse is astronomical. 
Pervasive automatic face recognition could be used to track 
individuals wherever they go. Systems operated by different 
organizations could easily be networked to co-operate in tracking 
an individual from place to place. This tracking information could 
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be used for many purposes…. even more insidiously, tracking 
information can be used to exert social control”104 
In addition, claims by companies and government agencies that 
their databases contain only wanted criminals raise other issues. 
Agre states that “we have to trust your word that the only people 
whose images are stored in the databases are wanted criminals, 
and we have to trust your word that you throw away all images 
that fail to match the database.”105 Agre also suggests that they 
really have no idea whether all of the people in the database are 
criminals as the quality control over these databases is far from 
perfect. Finally, even if the only people in the database today are 
criminals, the forces pushing down a slippery slope of ever-
expanding surveillance are nearly overwhelming.106  
Some of the issues which do not appear to have been dealt with by 
governments include who is permitted to collect information and 
under what circumstances; who is permitted to have access to the 
information and under what conditions; how are individuals able 
to review their information and correct inaccuracies; what is the 
process for people to challenge false rejects or claims that their 
image matches one on the system; how are private sector 
organizations who operate these systems on behalf of governments 
to be controlled and forced to be accountable to the populace and 
respectful of the national privacy laws. These are just some of the 
issues that remain outstanding and require clarification through 
legislation.  
“Technology can introduce significant social changes while 
escaping the “pattern of deliberation and review” that governs 
social change. The problem is that inattention to technological 
developments leads to an increased risk of unanticipated adverse 
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social outcomes.”107 These risks include loss of privacy, loss of 
governmental and private sector accountability, and eventually, 
loss of democratic participation as people withdraw from the 
overwhelming scrutiny.  
 It is noteworthy that “in contrast to laws that apply to 
government, there have historically been far fewer common law or 
legislative restraints on industry information gathering 
practices…common law doctrine and statutory regimes have 
historically offered fewer protections against private sector data 
collection in part because non-governmental surveillance …does 
not appear to erode democratic values.108 While the justification for 
the collection of this data has traditionally been defended as 
necessary in order to improve sales and marketing to customers, 
there is currently limited regulatory guidance to specify what 
information can be collected or whether these companies are 
prevented from sharing or selling those biometric records to 
others. This creates the danger of unscrupulous individuals or 
unethical companies accessing the personal information over 
which they have custody, in a nefarious manner that lends itself to 
fraud, identity theft, or “function-creep,” which occurs when 
personal information is used for a purpose not originally 
intended.109  
The unanimous consensus among commentators is that while the 
biometrics industry is attempting to create guidelines in order to 
self-regulate, “advocates of both privacy and facial recognition 
technology believe that there are too many dangers associated 
with these self-imposed guidelines, such as fraud and other illegal 
uses of the technology.”110  Further, both groups agree that 
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legislation is required to prevent misuse of the technology by 
governmental agencies, corporations, or private citizens.111  
According to McCoy, “the solution to the debate between privacy 
and the need for adequate and effective security measures can be 
resolved with appropriate legislation.”112 Further, “it is imperative 
that legislation defines the scope broadly enough to ensure the 
technology can be used effectively, but not so broad as to trample 
upon reasonable expectations of privacy.”113 The position is that 
detailed legislation will impact both law enforcement and citizens 
positively by creating a broad scope for the implementation of 
biometric technology while providing a focus on safeguarding 
privacy.114 
 Finally, it is important to acknowledge the fact that 
biometric technology is still developmental and evolving, and that 
“regardless of how much we invest in establishing standards for 
reliability of the technology and protections of the data from fraud 
or improper use, no system will be fool proof. Biometric 
determinations will be subject to mistakes, fraud, and abuse 
through human and technological error, both intentional and 
inadvertent.”115   
In addition, Mallon asserts that  
Recent studies have indicated a rather large percentage of 
error in the new technology. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology…recently conducted a study to 
measure the accuracy of face recognition systems. 
According to the results, posed photos of a person taken 
only eighteen months apart, were rejected by the system, 
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which indicated no match approximately forty-three 
percent of the time. An anticipated DOD study is expected 
to confirm these statistics.116  
A recent article confirmed additional technology failures during 
two separate tests conducted by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”) and a Japanese research group from the 
University of Yokohama. The ACLU test discovered that facial 
recognition technology failed to match the faces with the names of 
503 out of 958 volunteers, while the Japanese group discovered 
that fingerprints taken from drinking glasses could be replicated 
by jelly moulds, circumventing the effectiveness of fingerprint 
biometric technology.117 
Lastly, Anthony Allan, Research Director with Gartner Research 
speaking at the European Biometrics Forum in Dublin stated that  
Even if sophisticated biometrics gear was in place in US 
airports, the technology alone probably would not have 
stopped the attacks. ‘They were legitimate travellers,’ 
referring to September 11th terrorists, ‘they weren’t known 
as terrorists then, so they wouldn’t have appeared on 
recognition systems.’ Indeed, Allan said that without 
adequate back security measures and databases, 
biometrics equipment is more or less useless…. biometrics 
has proven to be fallible, with evidence available that has 
shown that wearing glasses can fool an eye scanner, 
prosthetic make-up can affect face scanners, a sore throat 
can change a voiceprint and that breathing heavily on a 
fingerprint scanner can also make prints 
unrecognizable.”118 
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During the same Forum, Kush Wadhwa, Director of Consulting 
from the International Biometrics Group, tried to dispel the notion 
that biometrics are the answer to world terrorism by asserting that 
“biometrics is a system like any other. Biometrics is one aspect, 
but one has to make sure all aspects of the system work.”119  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Biometric technology and its applications either offer tremendous 
opportunity in terms of increased security and safety, or a 
significant threat to privacy and the right to be free from 
unnecessary government intrusion into the daily affairs of the 
citizenry. The position one takes depends clearly on their 
viewpoint.   
Proponents of this new technology believe that biometrics offer 
the definitive solution to the current maladies that afflict our 
societies: the on-going terrorist threat; social services and identity 
theft; fraud; border security; controlling asylum seekers, 
identifying illegal immigrants and eliminating anonymity from 
online transactions. These are all legitimate objectives.  
 However, the proponents urgency for a renewed sense of 
safety and security together with the blind adherence to all things 
scientific, have prevented this group from acknowledging two 
essential facts: first, biometric technology is under development 
and in the midst of an evolutionary process. It is not foolproof, 
remains untested in large, complex situations and has an 
enormous error rate. Reliance on unproven technology to solve 
such a wide array of problems without acknowledging the 
                                                                                                                
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/07/22/snags_hold_up_biometrics_experts/>
, p.1. 
(Last accessed on 9 August 2004). 
119 Ibid., p.2 




technology’s limits is dangerous, and in the case of the politicians 
who continue to pursue biometrics as the ultimate remedy, 
negligent.   
Second, governments have historically had a difficult time using 
personal information contained in databases under their 
stewardship for only the purposes for which it was originally 
intended. As Matar points out, “history has shown us government 
officials have abused identification systems and databases in times 
of crisis…. government has a track record of using its authority to 
misuse the information with which it is provided in times of 
crisis. During such times, acts of illegal immigration, imminent 
threats of terrorism, and drug trafficking have trumped the 
importance of our basic civil liberties and privacy rights.”120  
Unfortunately, with biometric technology, this abuse may not be 
limited strictly to times of exigency, but could easily become a 
daily event, unbeknownst to the data subject. Government now 
has the option of utilizing the post September Eleventh reduced 
judicial scrutiny and relaxed legal requirements for monitoring 
individuals and increasing surveillance without any of the 
traditional privacy protections. Moreover, responses to privacy 
advocates concerns can now be dismissed by raising the 
“imminent terrorist threat” to quell objections to government 
activities which violate national privacy laws.  
The threat to personal privacy extends beyond governments to 
their agents, private sector companies who are in the business of 
developing biometric technology or collecting, storing and 
maintaining personal information on behalf of their government 
contracts. These third parties are currently operating with limited 
legal legislation or regulations, and do not contend with the same 
legal restrictions which apply to government bodies. They are 
considerably dangerous to individual personal privacy and think 
nothing of sharing information with other organizations or selling 
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private data to other groups, under the pretence that the 
information belongs to them. Nuala O’Connor, Department of 
Homeland Security Privacy Officer, recently conceded that several 
American airlines had admitted to sharing massive amounts of 
passenger data with government contractors.121 It is likely that this 
admission is only the tip of the iceberg. 
 It is imperative that governments develop privacy 
legislation and regulations that provide specific limits which 
define how biometric information is to be collected and used, by 
whom, and in what circumstances. Relying on existing legislation, 
which was drafted in a different time and under different 
conditions, when the application of biometric technology was not 
even a possibility, are not suitable for trying to curb the activities 
of governments and their agents in this new digital environment. 
In addition, any anticipated legislation should provide clear 
procedures for enabling citizens to verify and correct information 
that pertains to them, and a process for challenging false rejects or 
false positives when an individual is wrongly denied access on the 
basis of a system error. Further, proposed legislation should also 
include significant penalties for any individual or group, that is 
determined to have inappropriately abused their fiduciary duty and 
either used, accessed, shared or sold personal information without 
the “unambiguous consent” of the individual. Until then, 
biometric technology will not reach its full potential but will 
instead become a tool of government social control aimed at the 
very people it was intended to protect. 
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